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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks are by its nature prone
to various forms of security attacks. Authentication and secure
communication have become the need of the day. Due to single
point failure of a sink node or base station, mobile sinks are better
in many wireless sensor networks applications for efﬁcient data
collection or aggregation, localized sensor reprogramming and
for revoking compromised sensors. The existing sytems that make
use of key predistribution schemes for pairwise key establishment
between sensor nodes and mobile sinks, deploying mobile sinks
for data collection has drawbacks. Here, an attacker can easily
obtain many keys by capturing a few nodes and can gain
control of the network by deploying a node preloaded with some
compromised keys that will be the replica of compromised mobile
sink. We propose an efﬁcient three level key predistribution
framework that uses any pairwise key predistribution in different
levels. The new framework has two set of key pools one set of keys
for the mobile sink nodes to access the sensor network and other
set of keys for secure communication among the sensor nodes.
It reduces the damage caused by mobile sink replication attack
and stationary access node replication attack. To further reduce
the communication time it uses a shortest distance to make pair
between the nodes for comunication. Through results, we show
that our security framework has a higher network resilience to
a mobile sink replication attack as compared to the polynomial
pool-based scheme with less communication time .
Index Terms—Key predistribution, Security, Wireless Sensor
Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a wireless network
consisting of spatially distributed autonomous sensors to
monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as
temperature, sound, pressure, etc. and to cooperatively pass
their data through the network to a main location or a
base station. The more modern networks are bi-directional,
also enabling control of sensor activity. WSNs are found
to be extremely useful for a large area of applications.
Sensor networks can be deployed for habitat monitoring,
environmental monitoring including forest ﬁre detection,
air pollution and green house monitoring, industrial and
consumer applications. They are extremely useful in military
applications that demand high security for nuclear and
chemical attack detection, battleﬁeld surveillance and so
on[1].
Secure transmission of data is a crucial issue to be
addressed in WSNs. Due to broadcast nature of transmission
WSNs are vulnerable to various security attacks and since
the nodes are exposed they can be destroyed. Most important
security requirements are : Data Conﬁdentiality, Data
Integrity, Availability, Data freshness, Self-Organization,
Secure Localization, Time Synchronization, Access control
and Authentication.
Security is critical for such networks deployed in hostile
environments. Most sensor networks actively monitor
their surroundings, and it is often easy to tamper the
network to get the data and deduce information other than
the data monitored. Information leakage often results in
privacy breaches of the network in environment. Moreover,
the wireless communication employed by sensor networks
facilitates eavesdropping and packet injection by an adversary.
The combination of these factors demands for sensor networks
at design time to ensure operation safety, secrecy of sensitive
data, and privacy for people in sensor environments.
However, when the sensing ﬁeld is too far from the
base station, transmitting the data over long distances using
multihop may further weaken the security. The intermediate
may modify the data passing by capturing of sensor nodes,
launching a wormhole attack [2], sybil attack [3], selective
forwarding and sinkhole [4] attack. Forwarding data to
base station would increase the energy consumption at
nodes near the base station,reducing the lifetime of the
network. Therefore, mobile sinks (MSs) (or mobile soldiers,
mobile sensor nodes) are better option in the operation of
many sensor network applications, including data collection
in hazardous environments [5], localized reprogramming,
oceanographic data collection, and military applications.
Therefore, the security in sensor network is extremely
important. Many security algorithms have been designed
for wired and wireless networks but they cannot be used
in wireless sensor networks because of the limited energy,
memory and computation capability. Key management
protocols are the basis of the secure communications and
are the fundamental security mechanism in wireless sensor
network [6].
𝑀𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: Public key encryption techniques are
expensive for a WSN due to the higher coputation and
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storage cost. Various authentication and key predistribution
based on symmetric schemes exists for sensor networks. Data
gathering or reprogramming sensor networks using mobile
sinks has the problem of authentication and key establishment
among these sensor nodes. In the solutions based on the
basic probabilistic and q-composite key pre distribution
schemes, when a small set of sensor nodes is compromised
the attacker can easily obtain a large number of keys. Thus an
attacker can take control of the entire network by deploying
a replicated mobile sink preloaded with some compromised
keys to authenticate and then initiate data communication
with any sensor node. To address the above-mentioned
problem, we have developed a general framework that
permits the use of any pair wise key pre distribution scheme
to make pair between sensor nodes and Mobile Sinks based
on the polynomial pool-based key predistribution scheme.
The proposed technique will substantially improve network
resilience to mobile sink replication attacks compared to the
single polynomial pool-based key pre distribution approach
as an attacker would have to compromise many more sensor
nodes to launch a successful mobile sink replication attack.
In addition during the process of making pair between the
nodes for data transmission shortest path is selected.
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠: The three-tier security scheme is robust
against mobile sink replication attack and stationary access
node replication attack, as this scheme makes use of a one-
way hash chains algorithm along with the static polynomial
pool based scheme. There is no method to decide which pair
of nodes is better to communicate through stationary access
nodes. The main problem with this is the communication
overhead, and as a result of this it takes a considerable amount
of time. However, establishing pair wise keys in wireless
sensor networks is not a trivial task, particularly due to the
resource constraints on sensors. So in order to overcome
these drawbacks, we have developed a efﬁcient three
tier scheme with shortest distance for communication which
takes less time to establish a communication and transmit data.
𝑂𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛: The remaining part of the paper is
organized as follows: Related works are presented in section
II. Background is discussed in section III. Preliminaries
discussing the network model and adversary model is
presented in section IV. Section V describes problem
deﬁnition and algorithm. Implementation and performance
evaluation is shown in section VI. Finally, section VII gives
the conclusions of the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Recently, many researchers have been engaged in
developing schemes that address the unique challenges
in security of WSNs. Zia and Zomaya [7] have made an
effort to document the security issues in WSNs. Attacks,
countermeasures and threat models have been proposed in
different layers.
Key distribution for the sensor network is extensively
studied. Generally two approaches are given. One is key
distribution at the initial network deployment stage through a
Base station and and the other is key predeployment. Zhu et
al., [8] have proposed a key management protocol, Localized
Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP), that offers
many security beneﬁts to WSNs. It employs one base station
and assumes it to be trustworthy. It does not include defence
against hacked or compromised base station. Delan Alsouﬁ
et al., [9] have proposed a solution in order to overcome the
security issue with one base station by employing multiple
base stations.
One of the main concerns when designing a key
management scheme is the network scalability. Yu et
al., [10] have proposed a new scalable key management
scheme for WSNs, which provides a good secure connectivity
coverage. For this purpose, they make use of the unital design
theory. They show that the basic mapping from unitals to key
pre-distribution allows one to achieve high network scalability.
Nonetheless, this naive mapping does not guarantee a high
key sharing probability. Walid Bechkit et al., [11] propose an
enhanced unital-based key pre-distribution scheme providing
high network scalability and good key sharing probability.
Blundo et al., [12] proposed a key distribution scheme
for dynamic conferences, a method by which initially an
(off-line) trusted server distributes private individual pieces
of information to a set of users. In this setting, any group of
t users can compute a common key by each user computing
using only his private piece of information and the identities
of the other t - 1 group users. Keys are secure against
coalitions of up to k users, that is, even if E users pool
together their pieces they cannot compute anything about a
key of any t-size conference comprised of other users. The
polynomial-based scheme proposed applies to settings where
a limited coalition of up to a certain security parameter k
of adversaries are expected. A basic application is a secure
conference key generation.
Donggang Liu and Peng Ning ., [13] have developed two
pair wise key pre distribution schemes, a closest pair wise
3keys pre distribution scheme and a location-based pair wise
keys scheme using bivariate polynomials, by taking advantage
of sensors expected locations. Establishment of pair wise keys
is a fundamental security service, which forms the basis of
other security services such as authentication and encryption.
This paper presents several techniques for establishing pair
wise keys in static sensor networks. These techniques take
advantage of the observation that in static sensor networks,
although it is difﬁcult to precisely pinpoint sensors posi-
tions, it is often possible to approximately determine their
locations.These schemes can achieve better performance if
such location information is available and that the smaller the
deployment error (i.e., the difference between a sensors actual
location and its expected location) is, the better performance
they can achieve.
III. BACKGROUND
WSN mainly face the problem of mobile sink replication
attack. To overcome this problem, Amar Rasheed and Rabi
N. Mahapatra [14] proposed an efﬁcient three tier security
framework for authentication and pair wise key establishment,
based on polynomial pool based key pre-distribution scheme.
This technique is able to give network resilience to mobile
sink replication attacks. They preselect few sensor nodes as
stationary access nodes, which acts as authentication access
points that are capable of making the sensor nodes to send
their data to mobile sinks. They use two separate polynomial
pools: a mobile polynomial pool and a static polynomial
pool. Authentication between mobile sinks and stationary
access nodes are established by polynomials from the mobile
polynomial pool. Polynomials from the static polynomial
pool are used to ensure the authentication and keys setup
between the sensor nodes and stationary access nodes.Our
work present an efﬁcient pairwise key establishment among
the set of polynomials that match between the two levels with
the shortest path.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
This section presents our network model, assumptions made
about the network and the anticipated adversary.
A. Network Model
The proposed scheme uses Blundo scheme [12] based on
polynomial pools. Polynomial pool-based key predistribution
uses a polynomial pool instead of a single polynomial key
pool. Polynomials from the mobile polynomial key pool are
used to establish authentication among mobile sinks and
stationary access nodes to gain access to the network for the
sensor data gathering. Polynomials from the static polynomial
pool are used for authentication and keys setup between the
sensor nodes and stationary access nodes. Before deployment
a random subset of polynomials from the mobile polynomial
pool is given to mobile sinks, and a small set of sensor nodes
called as stationary access nodes are given a polynomial from
mobile polynomial pool. To launch a mobile replication attack
an attacker has to get atleast a single polynomial from mobile
polynomial pool to gain access to the network. Similarly
all sensor nodes and stationary access nodes are given a
random subset of polynomials from static polynomial pool.
The stationary access nodes, allow mobile sinks to access the
sensor network for data gathering. Thus, an attacker would
need to compromise at least a single polynomial from the static
pool to make a stationary access node replication attack.
∙ A mobile sink sends data request messages to the sensor
nodes through a stationary access node.
∙ The mobile sinks data request messages will initiate the
stationary access node to trigger sensor nodes to transmit
their aggregated data to the requested sink.
We assume a network that is composed of large number
of homogeneous sensors. The two senors can communicate
with each other directly or via other sensor after key match.
Keys can be matched in different ways that is we can have
(i) direct key discovery. (ii) Indirect key discovery through
intermediate stationary node or (iii) Indirect key discovery
through intermediate stationary access node .
V. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND ALGORITHM
Since sensor nodes are deployed in harsh, unattended remote
areas wireless sensor networks are susceptible to various
security attacks due to lack of tamper resistance, sensor node
failures, limited processing capabilities and non-availability of
human assistance. Since communication is wireless, secure
ways for communicating data are not available. Hence a
user can enter the network and obtain data for the event of
his interest by compromising sensor nodes. Given a sensor
network with mobile sinks instead of a base station, data can
be gathered from the stationary nodes through access nodes
using mobile polynomials in a secure way through a shortest
path .
A. Algorithm
The algorithm consists of three phases:
(i) Static and mobile polynomial key predistribution
(ii) Key discovery between mobile node and stationary node
(iii)Selecting shortest path among the feasible paths
1) Polynomial Key Predistribution: Given a sensor
network, let N ={ 𝑁1, 𝑁2, 𝑁3, . . . , 𝑁𝑛 } be a set of
n stationary sensor nodes. S ={ 𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝑆3, . . . , 𝑆𝑚}
be a set of m stationary access nodes and MS ={
𝑀𝑆1,𝑀𝑆2,𝑀𝑆3, . . . ,𝑀𝑆𝑟 } be a set of r mobile sinks. A
mobile polynomial pool M and a static polynomial pool S are
generated.The mobile sinks and stationary access nodes are
randomly given K𝑚 and one polynomial (K𝑚 > 1) from M.
The mobile polynomials in every mobile sink is more than
the number of mobile polynomials in every stationary access
node. This assures that a mobile node shares a common
mobile polynomial with a stationary access node with high
probability and reduces the number of compromised mobile
polynomials when the stationary access nodes are captured.
All sensor nodes and the preselected stationary access nodes
randomly pick a subset of K𝑠 and K𝑠-1 polynomials from S.
42) Key discovery between mobile node and stationary
node: The pairwise key between sensor node u and mobile
sink v is established by a stationary access node a. A
sensor node u needs to ﬁnd a stationary access node a in
its neighborhood, such that, stationary node a can establish
pairwise keys with both mobile sink v and sensor nodeu.
That is, a stationary access node needs to establish pairwise
keys with both the mobile sink and the stationary node. To
achieve this node a has to ﬁnd a common mobile polynomial
with the mobile sink and a common static polynomial with
the sensor node. For this sensor node will broadcast a list of
polynomial IDs. When a secure path is established between
nodes u and v, the mobile sink v sends the pairwise key k𝑐
to node a in a message encrypted and authenticated with the
shared pairwise key k𝑣𝑎 betweenv and a. If node a receives
the above message and it shares a pairwise key with u, it
sends the pairwise key K𝑐 to node uin a message encrypted
and authenticated with pairwise key K𝑎𝑢 between aand u.
When there is no direct key establishment between the
mobile sink and the sensor node then the key establishment is
done through intermediate nodes. To establish a secure direct
path their should be a stationary access node which shares a
common mobile polynomial with mobile sink and a common
static polynomial with sensor node. If no such direct path
is established it is done through an intermediate stationary
access node.
3) Selecting the shortest path: The key establishmen
through direct or intermediate nodes may have more than one
path between the sensor node and the mobile sink. We use
the shortest path calculated with Dijkstra algorithm to use
shortest distance. In other words, if the mobile polynomial
key match between mobile sink and stationary access node
and static polynomial key match between stationary nodes
and stationary access nodes exist with different intermediate
nodes then a shortest path is selected.
B. Security Analysis
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Setup
We evaluate the performance of our scheme by simulation
and compare it with earlier schemes. The simulation was
run using MATLAB . Nodes are randomly deployed into
100×100𝑚2. The region is divided into 10×10 cell units.
Nodes are randomly distributed and ensured that the number
of sensor nodes is greater than stationary access nodes eand
number of stationary access nodes are greater than mobile
sinks. Static and mobile polynomials are distributed before
deployment. Events are randomly simulated in later stages
for mobile replication and stationary access node replication
attack. The results show the comparison with previous
schemes
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Fig. 2. Number of source node v/s no. of polynomials generated
B. Results and Analysis
Figure 2 depicts that as the number of sensor nodes in
the network increases the polynomials generated in the
polynomial pool also increases. If x is the number of sensor
nodes present in the network then (5*x)+20 number of
polynomials are generated in the polynomial pool. Hence
the number of polynomials generated increases linearly with
the increase of the number of nodes. Since the number of
polynomials increases the Attacking becomes difﬁcult with
few compromised nodes..
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Fig. 3. Number of Neighboring sensor nodes v/s probability of key
establishment
Figure 3 depicts the Probability of a mobile sink establishing
a pairwise key with a sensor node versus the number of sensor
neighbours.The probability P of a mobile sink and a sensor
node establishing a pairwise key (directly or indirectly) is
estimated and for different values of Probability the results
are obtained.
Figure 4 gives the comparison of the our proposed TLKP
scheme with [14]. The time taken for data transmission and
connection establishment when a Shortest path Algorithm is
used with that when not used is seen in the ﬁgure 4. When a
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Shortest Path Algorithm is not used the time increases with the
increase in the distance between the source and the destination
which is indicated in the graph. This is due to the selection of
mobile sink and sensor node with a ﬁrst polynomial key match.
Whereas, when any Shortest Path Algorithm like Dijkstras
Algorithm is used the time taken for data transmission and
key establishment is reduced with the higher probability for
key mathes. When their exists many paths direct or indirect
shortest path is selected. So by using Shortest Path Algorithms
we can reduce the time taken for data transmission and
connection establishment for longer distances.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In wireless sensor networks security and privacy support
with minimum cost is a major concern. Authentication
and key establishment of mobile sink nodes by the sensor
network has been addressed due to the problem of mobile
sing replication attacks. In this paper we have proposed a
technique that supports security using three level polynomial
key predistribution to overcome mobile replication attack
and stationary access node replication attack. Also as the
communication time is prime concern we achieve by reducing
the number of hops and considering the minimum distance
among the three levels. This can be seen in the simulated
results.
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